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Abstract Most of the refugees arriving in Europe are fleeing civil war and unrest. 
However, it is important to recognise how the second-order effects of climate 
change—which can undermine agriculture and increase competition for water and 
food resources—are contributing to instability and decisions to migrate. while migra-
tory decisions are complex, climate change is an increasingly important contributing 
factor: it is threatening humanity’s shared interests and collective security in many parts 
of the world. The cumulative effects of these trends have serious implications for the 
stability of nations that lack sufficient resources, good governance and the resilience 
to respond. while there is a need for greater understanding of the detailed causes of 
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migration, as well as the associated economic and political instability, a growing body of 
evidence links climate change, migration and conflict in troubling ways.
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Introduction
The current migrant crisis in the Mediterranean was sparked by civil war and unrest in 
Syria, Libya and other places. But its roots go deeper: it is symptomatic of a process of 
dislocation reshaping the Levant, the Sahel and Sub-Saharan africa. Climate change 
is affecting basic environmental conditions such as rainfall patterns and temperatures. 
it is contributing to more frequent occurrences of floods, droughts and other natural 
disasters. over the long term, these changing conditions are likely to undermine rural 
livelihoods such as farming, herding and fishing. in effect, these factors squeeze the 
margins of rural life, and this rural dislocation shapes migratory decisions. of course, 
migratory decisions are complex. Climate change is not the sole or even the primary 
cause, but it is an important contributing factor and should not be ignored. Even when 
migrants list economic reasons for their migration—agricultural dislocation or price dis-
ruption, for example—the influence of climate change often lies beneath the surface. 
in summary, the second-order effects of climate change—less predictable or reduced 
agricultural production and greater competition for water and food resources—can and 
often do contribute to instability and to higher numbers of migrants.
These trends will add to the pressures facing local and national governments in the 
decades to come. in light of these challenges, advanced and developing nations must 
revise traditional concepts of security and focus on supporting basic governance and 
building the resilience of vulnerable communities. European and international leaders 
will have to deal with climate-driven crises and demographic pressures by mobilising 
resources at levels generally reserved for traditional competition between nation-states. 
Currently, the international community is not prepared. organisations such as the uS 
agency for international Development, the world Bank, the red Cross and the world 
Health organization do not have the financial capacity, manpower or global presence to 
deal with the effects of these challenging developments.
A pressing challenge for Europe
recent intelligence reports and simulations—including some conducted by the uS 
Department of Defense—conclude that vulnerable regions such as Sub-Saharan africa, 
the Middle East, South asia and South-East asia will face food shortages or price 
spikes, water crises and massive flooding driven by climate change in the coming dec-
ades. The destabilising effects of these events will impact the Eu and its foreign and 
economic interests. These insights lend urgency to attempts to rebalance the traditional 
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tools of diplomacy, development and defence to more effectively build basic human 
security. Thus far, Europe’s responses have been stymied by a lack of resources, a nar-
row bilateral focus and an absence of strategic coordination at the international level. 
Given the current influx of refugees, time is running out. a collective approach is essen-
tial, as responses will require investments in economic development, infrastructure, 
adaptation, and preventative efforts to bolster basic human and livelihood resilience that 
are beyond the capabilities of any single state.
However, the institutional tools and funding structures for such an approach have not 
yet been developed—and current policies within some of the Eu member states are 
dangerously counterproductive (see Kiai et al. 2015; Jacobson 2015). The Eu and its 
partners should refocus their engagement in order to address the slow-moving trends 
that are undermining basic human security. They should transfer greater authority and 
funding to agencies in charge of delivering foreign assistance and building resilience to 
climate change. Finally, they should revamp institutions to build interdisciplinary coun-
try teams able to address a wide array of overlapping factors linked to climate change, 
migration and instability.
The problems next door
The problems are developing next door, in north-west africa (werz and Conley 2012), 
where underlying trends of climate and demography have squeezed the margins of life 
at the family and community level, contributed to decisions to migrate, heightened con-
flicts over basic resources, and threatened to undermine state structures and regional 
stability. These developments may have exacerbated violence and contributed to the 
resulting migration—they dominated the policy debate in 2015.
according to the un, up to 250 million people in africa are projected to suffer from 
water and food insecurity this century, and three-quarters of rain-fed arable land in the 
Sahel will be greatly affected by climate change (Kandji et al. 2006; un 2014). rising 
temperatures, drought, desertification, erosion, flooding and sea-level rise all threaten 
different areas along the axis from nigeria to Morocco (see werz and Conley 2012; Di 
Bartolomeo et al. 2011). niger and northern nigeria have faced more frequent droughts 
and flooding over the last 30 years, along with temperature increases of between 0.5 °C 
and 1 °C (Kandji et al. 2006). The niger river has seen diminishing flows, a trend which 
is an existential concern for those reliant on its waters. if current water consumption 
trends continue, withdrawals from the niger basin will increase sixfold by 2025, with 
profound implications for the region. Lake Chad, a source of life for 25 million people, 
is drying up, and it is now down to one-twentieth of its size in 1960 (niasse 2005). 
The northern parts of algeria and Morocco, home to the population centres and most 
of the agriculture in both countries, may see reductions in rainfall of 10 %–20 % by 
2025 (alexander 2010). Finally, Lagos in the south and many parts of algeria’s and 
Morocco’s northern coasts are under threat from rising sea levels and saltwater intru-
sion (Folami 2010; o’neill 2009; Brown et al. 2011).
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These are not the abstract complaints of climate scientists but represent a profoundly 
disruptive trend in a region dependent on agriculture and other rural livelihoods such 
as herding and fishing, and lacking quality infrastructure and integrated markets to 
relieve localised disruptions. when faced with deteriorating conditions, humans have 
long turned to migration as a basic adaptive mechanism. and, of course, these trends 
must be combined with the rapid population growth projected to occur throughout the 
Sahel and west africa, increasing the strain placed on the countries along this migra-
tory route. niger has the world’s second-highest fertility rate and a median age of just 
15 years, and its population is expected to quadruple in the next century. nigeria’s 
population is expected to double by 2040. population growth increases the strain on 
already scarce natural resources such as water, land and food and further contributes 
to migratory decisions (un population Division 2010).
all these trends affect Europe: north africa and Sub-Saharan africa are traditionally 
tied together by long-standing and well-established migratory routes—routes which 
often continue on to Europe. as early as 2011, research indicated that some 65,000 
migrants were passing through agadez, niger on their way north to algeria, Morocco 
and Europe each year. as climate change takes its toll on farming, herding and fish-
ing—undermining livelihoods and contributing to decisions to migrate—these migratory 
movements could increase.
any effort to address the migrant tragedy playing out in the Mediterranean must 
understand and address these deeper root causes. The un has consistently tried to 
draw greater attention to the issue, and in 2008 the Eu’s foreign policy chief warned 
that large numbers of climate migrants from africa were headed for Europe (Martin 
2008). Though the alarm has been raised, policymakers are still tending to focus on the 
symptoms rather than the causes.
Europe finds itself in a particularly challenging political position. rising migration 
from africa—much of it illegal—has long been a contentious domestic issue in the Eu, 
which has responded by partnering with the african union to enhance safety at sea 
and formalise migration routes. The focus on better migratory coordination with the afri-
can union was intended to reduce illegal immigration while creating a strong system of 
integration and remittances. Yet these two regional organisations have vastly different 
capabilities. neither has made any serious concerted effort to cooperatively tackle the 
root causes of migration, such as climate change, rural disruption and conflict.
as important as the current work to regularise migration is, it will not resolve the 
migratory pressures on Europe. Javier Solana, the Eu’s former high representative for 
Common Foreign and Security policy, pointed out that climate change threatens the 
entire multilateral system of the international community. He argued almost a decade 
ago, that ‘the effects of climate change would promote a policy of resentments between 
all those who are responsible for climate change and those who are its worst victims’ 
(Martin 2008; see werz 2008). The warning was prescient: climate migration could con-
vert the Mediterranean into a flashpoint between Europe and africa.
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EU policy: a limited response
Despite the difficulties of aligning the interests of member states into a broader regional 
approach, the Eu has taken steps to address the nexus of climate, migration and secu-
rity in the Mediterranean basin. one of the measures is the regional focus of the Euro-
pean investment Bank (EiB) on the Mediterranean neighbourhood, with the intention 
of integrating EiB services into the region. a prime example is the Facility for Euro-
Mediterranean investment and partnership (see EiB n.d.), which provides financing 
and technical assistance to projects promoting sustainable economic growth along the 
Mediterranean littoral.
in the past decade, this financing has been accompanied by a promising process of 
institutional reform within the Eu and the partial integration of environmental and migra-
tion concerns with development assistance. The EiB’s 2009 establishment of the Mar-
seille Center for Mediterranean integration offers an example of these nascent changes.
The realisation of the interdependence of the countries of the Mediterranean littoral—
and their shared environmental concerns—constitutes an important step which, accom-
panied by projects to promote sustainable development and increase employment in 
migrants’ countries of origin, represents the opening attempt to tackle the problems 
posed by the nexus of climate change, migration and security. But there is undoubtedly 
a long way to go in integrating diverse institutional bodies, working with other regional 
institutions, and expanding the scope and magnitude of direct assistance to help other 
regions and appropriately reflect the magnitude of the challenge.
The need for research, coordination and funding
worldwide, the academic community continues to explore causal connections between 
climate change, environmental changes and migratory patterns. There is ample anec-
dotal evidence of the correlation between climate impacts and migration, but the exact 
causation of decisions to migrate is very difficult to definitively establish. Thus far 
no ‘smoking gun’ has been found that could serve to mobilise an appropriate policy 
response. However, irrespective of exact causality, the picture emerging in north-west 
africa and several other regions demands attention. a prudent strategic assessment 
calls for meaningful engagement with these trends now, rather than later. Such efforts 
would allow the academic community, international organisations and governments to 
develop ways to address underlying contributors to instability—to pioneer a fire pre-
vention approach rather than calling in the default firefighters, the uS Department of 
Defense.
in the face of these developments, governments in Europe need to design policies 
and projects that are cost-effective, resilient to climate change and able to meet the ris-
ing demand for resources. Today, security and prosperity is less about force and more 
about the ability to compel or organise collective action to solve transnational problems. 
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Europe, in concert with the uS, should broaden its conception of national security to 
encompass the underlying trends which threaten the stability of the rules-based interna-
tional order, which is the foundation of our own security and prosperity.
Such a joint approach could renew the transatlantic partnership at a strategic level. 
The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development review initiated by Secretary of 
State Clinton inaugurated this debate in the uS. For the first time, the State Department 
engaged in a strategic review to elevate civilian power and focus on human security and 
livelihood protection. But when it comes to real legal authority and, most importantly, the 
allocation of funds and manpower, the uS is still massively over-invested in traditional 
hard security capabilities and under-invested in the tools designed to build basic human 
security and prevent conflict.
of course, there are instances, such as in Mali or Somalia, where the situation has 
deteriorated too far to take preventative action. Sometimes it is simply too dangerous to 
try to address the root causes of insecurity. in these places it can make sense for the 
international community, in conjunction with local partners, to use military force to pro-
tect local populations and provide the conditions needed to build basic human security. 
But the international community, led by Europe and the uS, should be making a much 
bigger effort to prevent other places from descending into such conditions. Doing so 
means larger investments of people, time and money.
on-the-ground programmes to build such resilience include infrastructure invest-
ments such as irrigation systems, flood walls and mangrove protection, or housing for 
migrants—such programmes can help contribute to long-term stability in rural areas 
threatened by the effects of climate change. Transportation infrastructure can help bring 
crops to market and allow emergency supplies to reach disrupted areas. integrated 
markets allow for more gradual price adjustments and fewer shortages.
Simple technological and conservation fixes can also have disproportionate effects in 
bolstering human security and addressing the factors underpinning conflict and insta-
bility. in developing countries wood fuel provides about one-third of the total energy 
requirement. This proportion is higher in poor rural areas, such as parts of africa, where 
as much as 70 % of energy is derived from biofuels (international Energy agency 2014). 
in this context, providing inexpensive cooking stoves and solar lamps to fill this need 
can reduce deforestation, helping to prevent erosion and mitigate climate change while 
offering tangible evidence that governments are able to respond to fundamental chal-
lenges to human security, thus contributing to stability. Disaster preparedness steps, 
such as pre-positioning stocks and investing in emergency airlift and transport capabili-
ties, can help to allay the political fallout of environmental disasters. By getting ahead 
of these trends with preventative action, funders such as the uS and other developed 
countries can reduce the frequency and severity of more costly disaster-response or 
conflict-stabilisation efforts after the fact.
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Europe must play a central role in this effort and engage emerging powers in the pro-
cess. after all, the BriC1 countries and emerging players such as South africa collec-
tively doubled humanitarian assistance from 2005 to 2008 and will continue to be 
important players despite their economic troubles. it is time to encourage this trend and 
seek to cooperate. Creating a successful coalition to address climate impacts will also 
require the participation of the private sector. uS private philanthropy, remittances and 
private capital flows continue to exceed government assistance (Hudson institute 2013). 
also, private companies are often better than governments at tasks such as creating 
and securing supply chains or developing drought-resistant crops.
The infrastructure and commitment to addressing the root causes of conflict and 
instability such as climate change, rural disruption and migration need to match the 
scale of the threats that these factors underpin and perpetuate. in this regard, the most 
important obstacle to shifting funding and authority within the government to deal with 
underlying causes is political. in Europe, and even more so in the uS, it is difficult to 
address the imbalance of funding and authority between military and non-military activi-
ties. Foreign assistance lacks a domestic political constituency.
Lastly, academic research has yet to fully explore the direct causal connections 
between climate change, migration and human conflict. But the expected impacts of 
climate change overlap with current areas of insecurity and existing migratory routes—
the cumulative effects are therefore also important to consider. More information on 
the direct impacts of climate change and the secondary and tertiary effects, such as 
migration, staple prices and rural conflict or disruption is needed. Efforts such as the 
uS agency for international Development’s alert Lists, which analyse fragility and future 
climate trends, are a good start, but research on the topic requires more data to aid 
forecasting and improve understanding. in the era of big data, it is astonishing that pol-
icymakers were caught off guard by the spike in staple prices—caused in part by a 
remarkable series of abnormal weather patterns (see werrell and Femia 2013)—which 
prompted the global food crisis of 2011.
Conclusion
For both selfish and idealistic reasons, Europe should lead the drive for sustainable 
security. as the global emergency responder, the steps outlined above are cost-effec-
tive ways to reduce the burden of maintaining global stability. and as a beneficiary of 
the post-war liberal international order, the Eu has an obligation to respond to trends 
that threaten to undermine the stability of that order. Doing so will require the union, 
in coordination with the uS and other partners, to overcome a long list of challenges. 
However, it is past time for national governments and global institutions to grapple with 
a new century of complex crisis scenarios.
1 Brazil, russia, india and China.
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